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THE CONSTITUTIONAL ESSENTIALS OF
POLITICAL LIBERALISM
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, LEGITIMACY, AND
THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
A COMMENT
Frank L Michelman*
INTRODUCTION

My aims in this Comment are modest and primarily exegetical: to
assemble what John Rawls says about the question of judicial review,
and to resolve two apparent puzzles posed by his remarks bearing on
this question. The remarks I have in mind are all found in Rawls's
book Political Liberalism,' mainly in Sections 52 and 63 ("The Idea of
Constitutional Essentials" and "The Supreme Court as Exemplar of
Public Reason") of Lecture VI ("The Idea of Public Reason").4 It is
chiefly in these pages that Rawls reflects on whether and how judicial
review may comport with a certain political conception of justice,'
namely, the one he calls6 "justice as fairness" and commends as
morally apt for our society.
By "the question of judicial review" I mean simply the question of
having judicial review or not. It is not so easy, alas, to say exactly
what "judicial review" is,7 but a crude definition will serve our needs
here. Judicial review, we'll say, exists in a country's political* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.

1. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1996).
2. See id. at 227-30.
3. See id. at 231-40.
4. I have addressed these texts in writing twice before. See Frank I. Michelman,
On Regulating Practices with Theories Drawn from Them: A Case of Justice as
Fairness,in Nomos 37, Theory and Practice 325-36 (1. Shapiro & J. DeCew eds., 1995)
[hereinafter Michelman, Regulating Practices]; Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on
Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls
394, 403-07 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003) [hereinafter Michelman, ConstitutionalLaw].
5. On the meaning of this term, see Michelman, ConstitutionalLaw, supra note
4, at 398-400.
6. See id.
7. For discussions of the possible dimensions of variation for a judicial review
practice, see Michelman, Regulating Practices,supra note 4, at 325-26; Mark Tushnet,
New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-Based
Worries, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 813 (2003).
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institutional practice when (a) questions of the constitutionality of
legislation are regularly brought before courts for resolution; (b) the
courts address these questions afresh, with a substantial degree of
independence from the explicit or implicit opinions of other agents in
the system including those who enacted the questioned law; (c) the
resulting judgments of jurisdictionally competent courts are regarded
as binding on other departments of government unless and until
revised either by judicial decision or by constitutional amendment;
and (d) the result of a judicial declaration of a legislative enactment's
unconstitutionality is that the enactment thenceforth is treated as
invalid, voided of the force of law.8
I. SETTING THE STAGE: LEGAL DUALISM AND LIBERAL
LEGITIMACY

A. Constitutional-LegalDualism
The question of judicial review arises only with respect to political
and legal systems that are "dualist" in a sense conveyed by Rawls
when he writes that "constitutional democracy is dualist:
it
distinguishes ... the higher law of the people from the ordinary law of
legislative bodies." 9 The liberal political order envisioned in Political
Liberalism undoubtedly is constitutional-democratic and dualist.
Justice as fairness calls for substantive limits and constraints on
lawmaking, including requirements concerning "equal basic rights and
liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect,""l and
Rawls plainly expects that a society well-ordered by the standards of
justice as fairness will treat these requirements as higher law to which
ordinary lawmaking is beholden. 1 Thus, the stage is set for the
possible entrance of judicial review.
And yet the play of
constitutional democracy quite conceivably could go on without
judicial review, as we soon shall see. (If it could not, the judicial
review question would already be settled in the affirmative by the
commitment of political liberalism to constitutional democracy, which
Rawls plainly does not think is the case.) 2
8. These conditions describe a species of what Professor Tushnet calls "[sitrongform judicial review." Tushnet, supra note 7, at 815.
9. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 233.
10. Id. at 227; see id. at 291, 294-99 (explaining the "special status" of the basic
liberties associated with the first principle of justice).
11. See id. at 233.
12. As I show in Part II.A., Rawls maintains that justice as fairness does not
necessarily entail judicial review. He still might think constitutional democracy
necessarily entails it. That would be possible, however, only if Rawls were not
presupposing constitutional democracy as a feature of any political-liberal regime or
any regime that carries out justice as fairness. See, e.g., infra note 32. To my mind, the
better reading is that Rawls is presupposing constitutional democracy in his
reflections on judicial review. For Rawls, the connection between political liberalism
and constitutional democracy is about as deep as it can get. Rawls poses the
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B. Validation and Legitimation: Two Functions of ConstitutionalLaw
in Rawlsian ConstitutionalDemocracy
In the kind of dualist system envisioned by Rawls, it is understood
that not every series of events conforming to the accepted, formal
protocols for an act of lawmaking-for example, duly registered
approvals of a law-like text by majorities of quorums of both Houses
of Congress and by the President-necessarily produces true or valid
law, meaning minimally a norm or rule to which anyone purporting to
be law-abiding is expected thenceforth to conform his or her actions.
There is in place a higher level of law-constitutional law-and the
legal validity of the new enactment depends on the conformity of the
latter's content, not just its procedural pedigree, to the demands of the
higher law. 3 To be clear, the claim here is not that this resultunconstitutional legislative enactments fail to produce valid lawfollows logically and strictly from the very idea of dualism and the
"higherness" of constitutional law. 4 Whether it does or not is a
question we need not settle here-interesting as it may be to
jurisprudence-because the claim here is only that the result follows
in the kind of dualist system envisioned by Rawls.
Rawls understands law to be a medium always fraught with the
potential for coercion. How, then, he asks, is it possible that schemes
of social ordering by law may be morally permissible and perceived as
such by all? How may a regime of coercive, majoritarian lawmaking
possibly be justified among citizens presumed to regard themselves
and each other as individually "free and equal?"' 5 Rawls answers
with the proposition he dubs "the liberal principle of legitimacy,"16 in
which legal dualism figures crucially:
[Olur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials
"problem" of political liberalism as one of "work[ing] out a political conception of
justice for a... constitutional democratic regime." Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra
note 1, at xl-xli. His apparent assumption throughout his work on justice has been, as
he wrote in an early essay, that "a constitutional democracy of some sort is required
by the principles of justice." John Rawls, The Justification of Civil Disobedience
(1969), reprinted in John Rawls: Collected Papers 176, 180 (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999).
13. I discuss the relations between legal validity and constitutional law in greater
detail in Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 Rev.
Const. Stud. (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Contract]; Frank I.
Michelman, Living With Judicial Supremacy, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 579, 588-93
(2003) [hereinafter Michelman, JudicialSupremacy].
14. Given dualism, legislators who enact legislative content in contravention of
standing constitutional law no doubt act contrary to law, but perhaps it does not
follow from that premise that the ostensible legal products of their actions must lack
validity as law. Few of us, on reflection, will doubt that unlawful actions can alter the
state of the social or the legal world.
15. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 136-37, 217.
16. Id. at 137, 217.
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of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the
light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as
17 reasonable and
rational. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy.
We need not delve just now into the precise meanings of all the
load-bearing terms in this proposition.18 All we need is awareness of
three points. First, the "essentials" of a constitution include certain of
its particular formulations (typically in a bill of rights) of those "equal
basic rights and liberties," already mentioned, which "legislative
majorities are to respect."' 9 Second, to say that a given set of
constitutional essentials is acceptable to everyone viewed as
reasonable and rational is tantamount to saying that the set matches
up acceptably with certain principles laid down by Rawls under the
name of justice as fairness."0 Third, by "legitimacy" Rawls means a
certain sort of virtue in the system or "general structure of...
authority"21 by which laws in a given country are brought into being.
To call such a system legitimate is to say that moral justification exists
to enforce whatever laws may issue from that system against everyone
alike, including persons who may deeply, considerately, and
reasonably disagree with the justice or the prudence of some of those
laws.22

The "liberal principle of legitimacy" posits a necessary condition 3
for the legitimacy of any system of government by law, constitutional
democracy being one type of such a system. Such a system can be
legitimate, in the sense that all the laws issuing from the system can
justifiably be enforced against everyone including those who
reasonably regard them as bad and wrong, on condition that certain
"essential" components of the system are what they morally ought to
be" 4-which for Rawls means they are compliant with the principles of
justice as fairness.
Obviously, though, legitimacy cannot be decided merely by looking
to see whether some written instrument headed "Constitution"
contains a list of "essentials," including basic-liberties guarantees, that
appear to honor correct principles of justice. The question always will
17. Id. at 217; see also id. at 137 (offering a like formulation).
18. I do so in Michelman, Contract, supra note 13; Frank I. Michelman, Relative
Constraint and Public Reason: What Is "The Work We Expect of Law?," 67 Brook. L.
Rev. 963, 971-75 (2002) [hereinafter Michelman, Public Reason].
19. Supra text accompanying note 10; see Michelman, Constitutional Law, supra
note 4, at 403-06 (discussing "constitutional essentials").
20. See Michelman, ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 4, at 398-400; Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 1, at 291-92 (setting forth the two principles of justice as
fairness and elaborating on the first principle).
21. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 136.
22. See id. at 216-17; Michelman, Contract, supra note 13.
23. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 137. Rawls says coercive political
power is justified "only" when this condition is met. See supra text accompanying
note 17.
24. See Michelman, Contract,supra note 13.
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be whether such essentials are put effectively into practice. But they
are not put effectively into practice if and insofar as legislative
enactments in apparent violation of them are freely given effect as law
by being, as we commonly say, "enforced." In other words, the liberal
principle of legitimacy proposed by Rawls is satisfied only on
condition that the constitution provides what it morally ought to
provide and legislative enactments found at variance with
constitutional requirements are effectively voided of force.25 That is
why I say invalidity must follow from unconstitutionality in the kind
of constitutional-democratic, dualist system envisioned by Rawls-the
relevant, key feature of such a system being its reliance on the
effective rule of morally meritorious constitutional law as a guarantor
of the moral supportability of the system of legal governance in force
in the country.
C. Therefore, JudicialReview?
At this point, it may seem that there is for Rawls only one possible
answer to the question of judicial review: Political morality demands
it because political morality encompasses legitimacy,26 and legitimacy,
Rawls says, depends on ascertainable compliance by all ordinary
lawmaking with (morally adequate) constitutional law. True as both
those claims may be, however, they do not logically compel a choice
in favor of judicial review. What-and all-they require is that
certain norms be accepted as higher law, ascertained deviation from
which renders other acts of lawmaking non-valid. It does not follow
that any court of judges must or should be empowered to decide the
constitutionality of procedurally proper acts of lawmaking. Other
alternatives plainly are available, at least conceptually. For example,
it might be the legislature's office to judge the validity of its pending
enactments vis-a-vis constitutional requirements, and it might be the
electorate's office to send packing legislators whom the electors judge
to be shirking or mishandling that responsibility.
25. Here we must note a possible refinement. One may take the view that a norm
can be valid law although no court or other official actor stands ready to "enforce" it
or attach any punitive or other material consequence to non-compliance. Norms that
are in that sense non-enforceable may still be regarded as legally binding on their
addressees in the sense that anyone who flouts them without special justification is
blamable for contempt of the law. See, e.g., Michelman, Judicial Supremacy, supra
note 13, at 592. There thus remains a possible sense of the term "legal validity"
according to which the Rawlsian liberal principle of legitimacy might allow an
unconstitutional legislative enactment to produce "valid" law, although not law to
whose violation any adverse, material consequence may permissibly be attached.
Since Rawls's reflections on judicial review take no cognizance of such a possibility,
we safely may set it aside.
26. Legitimacy, remember, is defined as the moral justifiability of "the general
structure of authority" by which citizens direct coercive political power upon each
other. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 136; see supra text accompanying
notes 15-22.
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Legislatures and electorates no doubt may fail and err in
performing such offices, and the result then (lacking judicial review)
will be jeopardy to the Rawlsian legitimacy of the political order. But
so may judges fail and err-not just by mistakenly giving effect to
enactments that really do violate morally apt constitutional essentials,
but by mistakenly invalidating enactments demanded by morally apt
constitutional essentials-and the result if courts do thus err will be
the same, that is, jeopardy to legitimacy. Further complicating
matters are the following two possibilities: first, that among a set of
just constitutional essentials belongs a guarantee of the right of people
to rule themselves politically and this right is infringed by subjection
to judicial review;27 second, that the presence of judicial review
disastrously saps the will of legislators and electorates to look out for
constitutional violations.2" On these grounds and others that do not in
any way contradict Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy, generations
of Americans from the founding onward29 have questioned both the
necessity of judicial review for constitutional-democratic justice and
the compatibility of judicial review with constitutional-democratic
prudence. Many Americans do so today,3" and their arguments show,
at least, that these are fairly debatable questions.
II. RAWLS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW: TWO PUZZLES

A. A PragmaticStance Towards JudicialReview
Rawls apparently agrees that the questions are debatable. At any
rate, he forbears from undertaking finally to resolve them. He does
rally to the support of judicial review, but only to the limited extent of
defending it against charges that the practice cannot reasonably be
thought to advance the aims of constitutional democracy-because,
say, it is anti-democratic or anti-populist in principle. Rawls finds
such charges unsustainable as long as judicial decisions "reasonably
accord with the constitution... and with its amendments and
politically mandated interpretations," on the theory that, in such a
case, whatever constitutional law the reviewing court enforces may
fairly be said to emanate from "the higher authority of the people."'"
27. See, e.g., Michelman, Regulating Practices, supra note 4, at 327-29; Jeremy
Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of ConstitutionalRights, 13 Oxford J. Legal Stud.
18, 18-20 (1993).
28. The locus classicus is James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrineof ConstitutionalLaw, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
29. See 2 The Anti-Federalist No. 15, at 437, 440 (Brutus) (H.J. Storing ed., 1981).
30. Leading contemporary works in this vein include Larry D. Kramer, The
People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (forthcoming
2004); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999); Jeremy
Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999). Kramer, supra, is devoted largely to a
history of the American controversy over judicial review.
31. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 234.
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It will be primarily up to the people to direct their higher,
constitution-making authority as justice requires. Supposing they do
so (as Rawls surely is entitled to suppose when presenting a normative
account of justice in a constitutional-democratic society), the resulting
constitution will "specif[y] a just political procedure and incorporate[]
restrictions which both protect the basic liberties and secure their
priority," and a constitution of that type "allows a place for the
institution of judicial review."32 This all amounts to a claim by Rawls
that judicial review may be an on-the-whole effective way to carry out
the legitimacy principle's demand for assurance of the compliance of
ordinary lawmaking with a just set of constitutional essentials.
However, he does not hold it to be the only way, or the way that
necessarily is always and everywhere best. Judicial review, Rawls
concludes, "can perhaps be defended given certain historical
circumstances and conditions of political culture."33 That is as far as
he goes. In sum, it is plain that for Rawls, a choice against judicial
review, while it might in some circumstances be prudentially illadvised for persons concerned about liberal legitimacy, would not
ipso facto, at all times and places, be a choice against a political-liberal
conception of justice.34
B. The FirstPuzzle
So far, Rawls's stance appears clear and unequivocal. To say, as he
does, that justice as fairness can take judicial review or leave it,
depending on the circumstances, is not to equivocate; it is rather to
take a stand. Judicial review being neither always required by justice
nor always excluded by justice (so goes Rawls's claim), the question of
having it or not is a pragmatic one to be made with certain justicerelated concerns in view.
An appearance of equivocation may nevertheless enter the picture
when we take a closer look at Rawls's category of constitutional
essentials. Let us use the term "requirements of justice" to cover all
the substantive demands contained in the two principles of justice.
These demands include not only the basic-liberties guarantee of the
first principle but the resource-distributional demands of the second
principle, those of fair equality of opportunity and of the so-called
difference principle permitting only such inequalities as may be
conducive to the benefit of "the least advantaged members of

32. Id. at 339. But Rawls alsd stretches so far in the other direction as to allow for
the possibility that a non-dualist regime of "parliamentary supremacy with no bill of
rights" might be the "superior" choice from the standpoint of political liberalism. Id.
at 234-35.
33. Id. at 240.
34. This conclusion resembles that of Ronald Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin,
Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 33-35 (1996).
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society."35 In Rawls's view, a political system is unjust insofar as it
fails to ensure the application of public reason to legislative choices
affecting the satisfaction of any of the requirements of justice, not
merely insofar as it fails to ensure public reason's application to
choices affecting the basic liberties.36 It does not follow, though, in
Rawls's view, that every requirement of justice should be made into a
requirement of constitutional law. Rawls's name for the requirements
of justice that do belong in constitutional law is "constitutional
essentials."37
He includes in that category certain guarantees
respecting basic liberties, while excluding from it certain distributional
norms (those of the second principle) which he nevertheless holds to
be requirements of justice.3"
Notice the consequence when we recall Rawls's proposition that the
coercive exercise of democratic political authority is morally justified
only as long as it conforms to a proper set of constitutional essentials
(the "liberal principle of legitimacy").3 9 Combining this with the
exclusion of the second principle's resource-distribution norms from
the constitutional essentials, but also keeping in mind the inclusion of
those norms in the aims towards which a political practice must
honestly and constantly strive in order to satisfy justice, we get the
result,of a possible gap between legitimacy and justice. A "general
structure of authority"4 may be simultaneously legitimate-morally
deserving to have its laws complied with-and deviant from justice.
Such a structure is legitimate, Rawls says, if it observably and reliably
screens out lawmaking choices incompatible with any basic-liberties
guarantee contained among the constitutional essentials, but it also is
unjust insofar as it may fail to strive credibly and in good faith toward
fulfillment of the resource-distributional demands of justice as
fairness.
There is nothing wrong or untoward about allowing in this way for
the possibility of legitimacy in a governmental system whose
performance observably fails to measure up to justice. For what
purpose, after all, do we employ the term "legitimate," if not to
convey the complex judgment that a governmental system in the dock,
so to speak, for its clear shortfalls from justice continues nevertheless
to merit loyalty.4 ' On the other hand, the justice-legitimacy gap
35. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 291.
36. See Michelman, ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 4, at 400-03. On the bearing of
public reason, see Michelman, Public Reason, supra note 18, at 975-78.
37. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 227-30.
38. See id. There are certain exceptions to this generalization, and we shall come
to them. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
40. See supra text accompanying note 21.
41. See Michelman, Contract, supra note 13; Frank I. Michelman, Ida's Way:
Constructingthe Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 345, 35758 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Ida's Way].
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normally strikes us as something we have little choice but to accept in
a partially fallen world, 42 not as something we positively cherish and
therefore seek to introduce or preserve when it might be avoided.
Some cogent explanation therefore is required for excluding
distributional guarantees from the legitimacy principle even as we
insist on their figuring vigorously in the justice principle.
The puzzle I am driving at arises with Rawls's response to this need
for an explanation. His response is, in fact, somewhat complex,
although very compactly stated.43 Rawls writes:
Whether the constitutional essentials covering the basic freedoms
are satisfied is more or less visible on the face of constitutional
arrangements and how these can be seen to work in practice. But
whether the aims of the principles covering social and economic
inequalities are realized is far more difficult to ascertain. These
matters are nearly always open to wide differences of reasonable
opinion; they rest on complicated inferences and intuitive judgments
that require us to assess complex social and economic information
about topics poorly understood. Thus,... we can expect more
agreement about whether the principles for the basic rights and
liberties are realized than about whether the principles for social
and economic justice are realized. This is not a difference about
what are the correct principles but simply a difference in the
difficulty of seeing whether the principles are achieved. 4 4
For an American constitutional lawyer or law professor reading
those words, what immediately comes to mind is a justiciability
worry-which is to say, a worry about the suitability of a norm or class
of norms for judicial application. The lawyer thinks that Rawls is
saying, just as countless lawyers say, that we should be wary about
giving constitutional-legal status to norms whose ranges of arguably
correct application are so wide and whose correct applications
therefore are so contestable, so opaque to demonstrably correct
resolution, that these norms cannot credibly be imposed by judicial
bodies on differently minded legislative bodies without undue
disturbance to the relations of mutual respect that ought to subsist
between the two classes of bodies.4 5 Now, if that indeed is the worry,
or one of them,46 leading Rawls to divide the substantive demands of
justice into those that are and are not constitutional essentials, then
Rawls at this stage of his argument is presupposing judicial review's
existence. But such an assumption seemingly runs counter to Rawls's
42. See Michelman, Ida's Way, supra note 41, at 352-58.
43. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 229-30.
44. Id.
45. For a measured, representative discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Designing
Democracy: What Constitutions Do 223-24 (2001).
46. In fact, I believe there is a further worry about transparency that holds
without regard to expectations about judicial review. See Michelman, Constitutional
Law, supra note 4, at 404-06; infra Part III.B.
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avowals that justice as fairness does not contain an answer to the
question of judicial review but rather leaves that question open to
pragmatic calculations whose results may vary across national
systems. Thus, our first puzzle. Why reject a certified prerequisite for
justice from the prerequisites for legitimacy just because that
particular prerequisite is ill-suited to a practice-judicial review-that
neither justice nor legitimacy requires? (Why not rather dispense
with or hem in judicial review?)
C. The Second Puzzle
Whether out of a concern about justiciability or for some other
reason, Rawls plainly does hold that excessive difficulty in
ascertaining the fulfillment of a justice norm, or in securing agreement
on that question, is a reason to omit that norm from the package of
constitutional essentials that sets the conditions of legitimacy for the
governmental order, according to the liberal principle of legitimacy.
Yet he seems to maintain this stance inconstantly. Without apparent
hesitation, Rawls includes among the constitutional essentials a
requirement that the political liberties of everyone be guaranteed
their "fair value."47 "Fair value" of the political liberties means that
everyone, regardless of social or economic position, has a "fair
opportunity to hold public office and to influence the outcome of
political decisions," and Rawls thinks it clear that a political order
lacking such a commitment would not be rationally acceptable to
every reasonable inhabitant of a constitutional-democratic political
culture.4 8 Fair value plainly is a distributional norm, and judgments
regarding its satisfaction seem open to the sorts of obscurities and
uncertainties that Rawls says attach generally to judgments regarding
fair opportunity as well as to judgments under the difference principle
regarding which policies will and which will not improve the prospects
of the least advantaged.4 9
At least as strikingly, Rawls explicitly includes among the
constitutional essentials the guarantee of what he calls a "social
minimum" providing for satisfaction of citizens' "basic" material
needs insofar as required to enable them to take effective part in
political and social life.5" The pressure such guarantees create toward
over-extension of the judicial role have been very widely noticed.

47. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 338.
48. Id. at 327-28.
49. For example, what does fair value of the political liberties demand in the way
of equalization of the resources available for a person's primary and secondary
education? See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 111-17
(1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 136-48
(1987).
50. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 7, 166, 228-29.
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How, then, can Rawls include it as a constitutional essential while
excluding fair equality of opportunity? That is the second puzzle.
III. ANSWERS
A. Assuming Justiciabilityis the Driving Concern
These puzzles are easy, hardly puzzles at all. Both yield to a single
solution, which proceeds in two stages. At the first stage, we assume
that a difference in degrees of justiciability is the only difference
Rawls sees between basic-liberty guarantees and distributional
guarantees, leading him to conclude that the former but not the latter
belong among the constitutional essentials. On that assumption,
Rawls's claim is that the relative non-justiciability of distributional
norms of justice is a factor to be considered in constitution-writing, in
case the relevant considerations otherwise weigh strongly in favor of
judicial review.
We imagine a chooser, a constitution-writer, whose choices
presumably are governed by the pursuit of the political conception of
justice as fairness. Any choice in favor of judicial review thus will
reflect a set of considerations that figure as reasons from within justice
as fairness. We have already noticed in a rough way what might be
the justice-sourced reasons for choosing for or against judicial review.
Against such a choice, there would be weighing a concern that by
committing decisions regarding the demands of justice upon politics to
an electorally unaccountable judiciary, we compromise the equalitythe fair value-of political liberty. We cramp the development and
exercise of the rank-and-file's capacities for a sense of justice. 1 On
the other side of the balance would be weighing beliefs that legitimacy
depends on both the aptness to justice and the public credibility of the
applied meanings attributed to the constitutional essentials, the
meanings they acquire in the crucible of live political practice, and
that independent judiciaries are better able than ordinary political
bodies to produce apt and credible resolutions. So even granting
judicial review's detraction from the fair value of political liberty,
judicial review still might-although it also might not-be found onbalance favorable to the aim of realizing the most fully adequate total
scheme of basic liberties that is practically within reach.
Suppose that the foregoing is roughly, in a nutshell, the Rawlsian
justice-sourced argument for (or against) judicial review. Suppose we
have a constitution-writer who, accepting this framework, estimates
that the net contributions of judicial review to legitimacy will be very
great, but only as long as highly non-ascertainahle norms are kept out

51. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
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of the judicially enforceable parts of the constitution.5 2 In such a case,
might not the writer prudently presume against including any such
norms in the constitution? Might she not prudently decide to exclude
all such norms except those, if there are any, whose inclusion is so
crucial to legitimacy as to overcome losses owing to damaged or
forgone judicial review, which will attend their inclusion? Rawls, we
may infer, believes that neither fair equality of opportunity nor the
difference principle rises to that level of urgency. It is "more urgent,"
he writes (plainly with legitimacy in view), that "the essentials dealing
with the basic freedoms" be settled by constitutional law.53 Given
"firm agreement" on these essentials along with fair-seeming,
recognizably democratic political procedures, "willing political and
social cooperation between free and equal persons can normally be
maintained" 5 4-or, in other words, legitimacy is sufficiently served.
This answer to the first puzzle points directly to an answer to the
second. Rawls, we are assuming for the moment, believes that
justiciability (suitability to enforcement by judges) makes a difference
that counts in deciding which of the requirements of justice as fairness
should and should not be classed as constitutional essentials, or, in
other words, which should and should not be written into
constitutional law. But to believe that justiciability does always
matter for this choice is not necessarily to believe that justiciability
always-or ever!-is the only consideration that matters. Another
that does, as we have just seen, is that of urgency in relation to liberal
legitimacy. In Rawls's view, a graphic guarantee that everyone shall
enjoy the fair value of the political liberties is, in fact, urgently
required for the legitimacy of any system for the exercise of political
power,55 and likewise, apparently, for the assurance that everyone's
basic material needs are met. The urgency factor that applies to
assurances regarding the basic liberties also applies to these two
distributional assurances. That observation argues for giving both of
them some expression in constitutional law, even if at the cost of
involving courts in decisions of a kind for which they are not
especially well suited. (Alternatively, the result may be that courts
forbear to judge beyond the bounds of their competence and we wind
up having some constitutional rights that are judicially "underenforced," a situation that Lawrence Sager argues convincingly we
can live with.)56

52. For what is meant here by "non-ascertainable," see supra text accompanying
notes 44-45.
53. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 230.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 299, 327-29.
56. See Lawrence G. Sager, The Why of ConstitutionalEssentials, 72 Fordham L.
Rev. 1421, 1424-26 (2004).
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B. JusticiabilityAside
To this point, we have assumed that when Rawls points out the
relative non-ascertainability of fair equality of opportunity and the
difference principle, 7 he is making a point about justiciability or overextension of the judicial role. It is only on the basis of that
assumption that any tension at all can be found between Rawls's
exclusion of those two requirements of justice from the constitutional
essentials and his professed agnosticism regarding judicial review.
That assumption, however, is highly questionable. Rawls has reasons
for concern about the relative ascertainability of constitutional
essentials that are non-dependent on judicial review and stem directly
from the liberal principle of legitimacy.58
Recall the crucial place of the idea of constitutional essentials in the
liberal principle of legitimacy. 9 These selected features of the basic
structure are to bear the full weight of legitimation in the first
instance. The stated prerequisite to the moral supportability of the
legal coercion emanating from the structure is that all such coercion
should be constrained by an aptly selected set of constitutional
essentials. Only on that condition may the structure and its coercive
authority be rationally acceptable to all reasonable citizens. It follows
that, in deciding which basic features of a regime are and which are
not to be regarded as constitutional essentials, we have to avoid errors
not only of under-inclusion, but also of over-inclusion.
Omission of one or another item from the list of those placed
beyond the tender mercies of majorities-liberty of conscience, for
example-may render the regime not rationally acceptable to the
reasonable. That would be the error of under-inclusion, and it is
obvious. Perhaps less obvious is what risk we might pose to
legitimacy by placing in the category of constitutional essentials each
and every dimension of political justice upon which rational citizens
reasonably would insist. If (as in justice as fairness) a commitment to
the difference principle is held to be such a dimension, what possibly
can be hazardous to legitimacy in writing that commitment into
constitutional law? A part of the answer is "non-transparency."
Consider that, in a Rawlsian view, I can willingly accept the daily
run of coercive acts from a constituted regime, despite my reasonable
moral and prudential aversion to many of them, as long (but only as
long) as two conditions are satisfied: (1) I regard this regime as
universally reasonably acceptable by the rational, and (2) I see my
fellow citizens abiding by it. But this conjunction of perceptions is
possible for me only if I can at all times see what the regime actually is
57. See supra text accompanying note 44.
58. The following explanation is taken from Michelman, Constitutional Law,
supra note 4, at 404-06.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
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that my fellow citizens are abiding by, so that I can check whether that
regime, the one actually in force, does in fact meet the test of
universal reasonable and rational acceptability.
(That is why
interpreters, as Rawls says, must always be seen to be interpreting one
and the same constitution.)60 Now since, according to Rawls, the
regime's acceptability to me is given in the first instance by its
incorporation of correct settings for a certain, minimal set of required
features-the constitutional essentials-then (if the fact of this
incorporation is to be at all times observable by me) the requirements
in the minimal set had better not be too opaque to a compliance check
by reason of technical complexity of application. Such considerations
plainly enter into Rawls's view that basic liberty rights can be
constitutional essentials while the difference principle cannot.
IV. CONCLUSION

Rawls's responses to the judicial review question and closely related
matters are pragmatic ones guided by the moral content of justice as
fairness. That is a merely exegetical and stylistic conclusion. Beyond
it lie some hard and deep substantive questions, chiefly whether
Rawls's constitution-centered theory of normative legitimacy is a
good one. Those questions are for another day. The task for this day
has been that of getting clear what the theory is, especially as it bears
upon the question of judicial review.

60. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 237.

